NOTICIAS

Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senator Marco Rubio sent a letter to U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioner Allison Herren Lee regarding the impact of the SEC’s agenda on so-called environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics, and whether those same standards would apply to companies based or operating in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Rubio highlighted the potential hypocrisy of requiring disclosures related to ESG without also requiring disclosure of companies’ human rights practices in China. 

“[P]revious positions taken by the Commission indicate that the consistent application of its policies to the PRC is not guaranteed,” Rubio wrote. “In recent years, the Commission has created arbitrary exceptions to its general rules for activities in the PRC.”

“For example, a standard purporting to provide information about issuers’ relevant ‘social’ businesses practices that required the disclosure of ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ practices with respect to their workforces in the United States, but not the complicity of those same issuers in supporting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s many human rights abuses within the PRC or globally would be, at the very least, highly inconsistent and arbitrary…” Rubio continued. “[Consider] [w]hether China-based issuers or issuers with significant business in the PRC should require the representation or information about the representation of underrepresented ethnic or religious groups historically oppressed by the CCP, including Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim groups, Tibetans, Christians, and practitioners of Falun Gong, among others.”

“If the level of ‘investor demand’ for an ESG disclosure for business activity in the U.S. is diminished for substantially similar, or even more substantial activities in the PRC, it may indicate that the disclosure is not primarily about providing beneficial and consistent information to investors about that activity, but instead is an arbitrary attempt to influence issuers on certain domestic political affairs,” Rubio concluded.

Rubio also argued that the SEC should consider how to consistently apply its standards to supply chain resiliency and investor protection. 

“Given the CCP’s control over strategic sectors in China and elsewhere, supply chains located in China or which rely on PRC-based partners pose risks to resiliency and sustainability,” Rubio said. “The hoarding of medical supplies by the PRC during the COVD-19 pandemic is one prominent example of these risks.” 

El texto de la carta en inglés está aquí. is below:

Dear Chair Gensler and Commissioner Lee:     

I write to comment on the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission)’s expected rulemakings and guidance with respect to the disclosure of information related to so-called environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics by issuers with significant business activities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), China-based issuers, and investment funds with significant investments in the PRC.

Expanding disclosures related to ESG would apparently be among the Commission’s most significant actions in recent history. As one of you said earlier this year, “no single issue has been more pressing for [the then-Acting Chair] than ensuring that the SEC is fully engaged in confronting the risks and opportunities that climate and ESG pose,” and “[t]here is really no historical precedent for the magnitude of the shift in investor focus that we’ve witnessed over the last decade toward the analysis and use of climate and other ESG risks.”

Given the apparent significance of these policies and magnitude of business activity in the PRC by potentially affected issuers, the consistent application to the PRC of any disclosure requirements related to ESG that may be proposed by rulemaking or guidance would be critical to the Commission achieving its policy goals and ensuring the internal consistency of those requirements. For example, a standard purporting to provide information about issuers’ relevant “social” businesses practices that required the disclosure of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” practices with respect to their workforces in the United States, but not the complicity of those same issuers in supporting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s many human rights abuses within the PRC or globally would be, at the very least, highly inconsistent and arbitrary.

However, previous positions taken by the Commission indicate that the consistent application of its policies to the PRC is not guaranteed. In recent years, the Commission has created arbitrary exceptions to its general rules for activities in the PRC. For example, the Commission has, for a decade, permitted the listing of China-based issuers and some issuers with significant business activities in the PRC on U.S. stock exchanges without the enforcement of applicable U.S. law pertaining to the ability of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to inspect the audits of those issuers. Though the Commission has begun taking important steps to address this disparity, the fact remains that the Commission’s policy in this area operates from a baseline exception for the PRC.

Additionally, in August 2021, the Commission approved a proposed rule change by the stock exchange, Nasdaq, related to board diversity that provided arbitrary flexibility for foreign issuers. Under the rule, foreign issuers, including China-based issuers, are exempt from board diversity disclosures if they are based in a jurisdiction that prevents such disclosures. This gives PRC the ability to exempt China-based issuers from the rule, just as the PRC does for audits by the PCAOB. Even if the PRC does not exempt China-based issuers from the rule, the rule provides the further flexibility that foreign issuers, including China-based issuers, can meet board diversity requirements by adding an additional female director or other individual instead of an underrepresented minority, while U.S. issuers must add both. The Commission approved these exceptions for foreign and China-based issuers despite the fact that the exchange’s stated basis for its rule—to correct the “historical marginalization” of underrepresented minorities—applies strongly to China under the control of the CCP. 

In light of this past inconsistency and ongoing issues in the PRC, I write to comment on a number of areas potentially subject to the expected ESG rulemaking or guidance. In these areas, the consistent application of disclosure requirements to entities connected to the PRC would be necessary for the rulemaking or guidance to achieve the Commission’s stated policy goals, or otherwise ensure their internal consistency. Each area raises a number of important considerations. 

A. Human rights. Disclosures that purport to convey the adherence of an issuer to certain “social” standards should include whether the issuer has violated, or participated, wittingly or unwittingly, in the support of violations of human rights, and the extent to which the issuer had knowledge of such violations or participation. A “social” metric that fails to account for the involvement of issuers in these violations would be obviously arbitrary. But it would also be something worse than arbitrary. Failing to account for specific human rights violations recognized by U.S. law would risk, in the eyes of investors concerned with “social” standards, absolving issuers of violations of fundamental human rights so long as they comply with other standards that are considered “social” by the Commission. This failure would be most evident with respect to the application of such standards to the PRC. The PRC under the control of the CCP is committing egregious human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and genocide. Therefore, I ask that the Commission consider and address the following in any applicable ESG rulemaking or guidance:

 1.      Whether the involvement of an issuer, directly or indirectly, in human rights violations recognized under U.S. law should be specifically disclosed, including:

B. Supply chain resiliency and sustainability. Disclosures that purport to convey information about the resiliency or sustainability of an issuer’s supply chains should account for the vulnerability of those supply chains to unforeseen manipulation by other actors, especially by governments or agents of governments with jurisdiction over relevant supply chain assets. The loss or diminishment of supply chain assets because of this kind of manipulation would be at least as adverse to an issuer as loss related to other unsustainable practices. Given the CCP’s control over strategic sectors in China and elsewhere, supply chains located in China or which rely on PRC-based partners pose risks to resiliency and sustainability. The hoarding of medical supplies by the PRC during the COVD-19 pandemic is one prominent example of these risks. Therefore, I ask that the Commission consider and address the following in any applicable ESG rulemaking or guidance: 

C. Governance. Disclosures that purport to convey information about the governance of an issuer should include certain basic governance characteristics that, for U.S.-based issuers, may be considered too widely in use to merit specific disclosure, but in China may have limited use or not otherwise apply to China-based issuers. To the extent that the disclosure of governance information aims to provide information about the accountability of an issuer’s decision-making to shareholders, such as with respect to the election of directors or adoption of shareholder proposals, it rests upon fundamental norms of corporate governance that may not apply in the PRC. With respect to China-based issuers, disclosure of an issuer’s compliance with more basic norms of corporate governance may be necessary to establishing the efficacy of disclosures for the other governance characteristics proposed by proponents of ESG. Moreover, issuers with significant business activity in the PRC may have their own corporate governance arrangements affected by that activity, such as if a PRC-based subsidiary or partner is represented by a seat on the board of directors of the issuer. Therefore, I ask that the Commission consider and address the following in any applicable ESG rulemaking or guidance:

D. “Diversity, equity, and inclusion.” Disclosures that purport to convey information about the contribution of an entity to, or compliance of an entity with standards related to the agenda often referred to as “diversity, equity, and inclusion” raise novel issues with respect to their application to the PRC. Therefore, I ask that the Commission consider and address the following in any applicable ESG rulemaking or guidance:

As these subject areas demonstrate, requiring the disclosure of social policies by issuers, as the expected ESG rulemakings or guidance may propose, raises important considerations for how those policies apply consistently with respect to the PRC. Moreover, the implications of ESG disclosures for issuers and business activity in the PRC helpfully isolate the principles that the disclosures purport to advance outside of their immediate domestic political context. If the level of “investor demand” for an ESG disclosure for business activity in the U.S. is diminished for substantially similar, or even more substantial activities in the PRC, it may indicate that the disclosure is not primarily about providing beneficial and consistent information to investors about that activity, but instead is an arbitrary attempt to influence issuers on certain domestic political affairs. 

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and consideration of these issues. 

Atentamente,