| 118TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION | S. | |
|------------------------------|----|--|
| | | |

To require a report on the threats posed by control of strategic ports by the People's Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

| Mr. | Rubio (for | · himself, | Mr. Kei | LLY, and | l Mr. Sco | OTT of Flor | rida) intr | oduced |
|-----|---------------|------------|-----------|----------|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------------|
| | the following | ng bill; w | which was | read tv | wice and | referred to | the Con | \mathbf{mittee} |
| | on | | | | | | | |

A BILL

To require a report on the threats posed by control of strategic ports by the People's Republic of China.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
- 3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
- 4 This Act may be cited as the "Strategic Ports Re-
- 5 porting Act".
- 6 SEC. 2. REPORT ON THREATS POSED BY CONTROL OF
- 7 STRATEGIC PORTS BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-
- 8 LIC OF CHINA.
- 9 (a) Study Required.—The Secretary of Defense
- 10 shall conduct a study of—

| 1 | (1) strategic ports; |
|----|---|
| 2 | (2) the reasons such ports are of interest to the |
| 3 | United States; |
| 4 | (3) the activities and plans of the Government |
| 5 | of the People's Republic of China to expand its con- |
| 6 | trol over strategic ports outside the People's Repub- |
| 7 | lic of China; |
| 8 | (4) the public and private actors, such as China |
| 9 | Ocean Shipping Company, that are executing and |
| 10 | supporting the activities and plans of the Govern- |
| 11 | ment of the People's Republic of China to expand its |
| 12 | control over strategic ports outside the People's Re- |
| 13 | public of China; |
| 14 | (5) the activities and plans of the Government |
| 15 | of the People's Republic of China to expand its con- |
| 16 | trol over maritime logistics by promoting products, |
| 17 | such as LOGINK, and setting industry standards |
| 18 | outside the People's Republic of China; |
| 19 | (6) how the control by the Government of the |
| 20 | People's Republic of China over strategic ports out- |
| 21 | side the People's Republic of China could harm the |
| 22 | national security or economic interests of the United |
| 23 | States and allies and partners of the United States; |
| 24 | and |

| 1 | (7) measures the United States Government |
|----|--|
| 2 | could take to ensure open access and security for |
| 3 | strategic ports. |
| 4 | (b) CONDUCT OF STUDY.—The Secretary of Defense |
| 5 | may enter into an arrangement with a federally funded |
| 6 | research and development center under which the center |
| 7 | shall conduct the study described in subsection (a). |
| 8 | (c) Report Required.— |
| 9 | (1) In general.—Not later than one year |
| 10 | after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec- |
| 11 | retary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate |
| 12 | congressional committees a report on the findings of |
| 13 | the study conducted under subsection (a). |
| 14 | (2) Elements.—The report required by para- |
| 15 | graph (1) shall include— |
| 16 | (A) a detailed list of all known strategie |
| 17 | ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or |
| 18 | indirectly, by the People's Republic of China |
| 19 | and an assessment of the national security and |
| 20 | economic interests relevant to each such port; |
| 21 | (B) a detailed list of all known strategie |
| 22 | ports operated, controlled, or owned, directly or |
| 23 | indirectly, by the United States and an assess- |
| 24 | ment of the national security and economic in- |
| 25 | terests relevant to each such port; |

| 1 | (C) an assessment of vulnerabilities of— |
|----|---|
| 2 | (i) ports operated, controlled, or |
| 3 | owned, directly or indirectly, by the United |
| 4 | States; and |
| 5 | (ii) strategic ports; |
| 6 | (D) an analysis of the activities and ac- |
| 7 | tions of the Government of the People's Repub- |
| 8 | lie of China to gain control or ownership over |
| 9 | strategic ports, including promoting products, |
| 10 | such as LOGINK, and setting industry stand- |
| 11 | ards; |
| 12 | (E) an assessment of how the Government |
| 13 | of the People's Republic of China plans to ex- |
| 14 | pand its control over strategic ports outside of |
| 15 | the People's Republic of China; |
| 16 | (F) a suggested strategy, developed in con- |
| 17 | sultation with the heads of the relevant United |
| 18 | States Government offices, that suggests |
| 19 | courses of action to secure trusted investment |
| 20 | and ownership of strategic ports and maritime |
| 21 | infrastructure, to protect such ports and infra- |
| 22 | structure from the control of the Government of |
| 23 | the People's Republic of China, and to ensure |
| 24 | open access and security for such ports, that in- |
| 25 | cludes— |

| 1 | (i) a list of relevant existing authori- |
|----|--|
| 2 | ties that can be used to carry out the |
| 3 | strategy; |
| 4 | (ii) a list of any additional authorities |
| 5 | necessary to carry out the strategy; |
| 6 | (iii) an assessment of products owned |
| 7 | by the Government of the People's Repub- |
| 8 | lic of China or an entity affiliated with |
| 9 | such government that are used in connec- |
| 10 | tion with strategic ports or maritime infra- |
| 11 | structure; |
| 12 | (iv) an assessment of costs to secure |
| 13 | trusted investment and ownership of stra- |
| 14 | tegic ports and replace products owned by |
| 15 | the Government of the People's Republic of |
| 16 | China or an entity affiliated with such gov- |
| 17 | ernment that are used in connection with |
| 18 | such ports; and |
| 19 | (v) a list of funding sources to secure |
| 20 | trusted investment and ownership of stra- |
| 21 | tegic ports, which shall include— |
| 22 | (I) an identification of private |
| 23 | funding sources; and |
| | |

| 1 | (II) an identification of public |
|----|--|
| 2 | funding sources, including loans, loan |
| 3 | guarantees, and tax incentives; and |
| 4 | (G) a suggested strategy for Federal agen- |
| 5 | cies to maintain an up-to-date list of strategic |
| 6 | ports. |
| 7 | (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph |
| 8 | (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may |
| 9 | include a classified annex if necessary. |
| 10 | (d) Definitions.—In this section: |
| 11 | (1) Appropriate congressional commit- |
| 12 | TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com- |
| 13 | mittees" means— |
| 14 | (A) the Committee on Commerce, Science |
| 15 | and Transportation, the Committee on Armed |
| 16 | Services, and the Select Committee on Intel- |
| 17 | ligence of the Senate; and |
| 18 | (B) the Committee on Transportation and |
| 19 | Infrastructure, the Committee on Energy and |
| 20 | Commerce, the Committee on Armed Services |
| 21 | and the Permanent Select Committee on Intel- |
| 22 | ligence of the House of Representatives. |
| 23 | (2) Relevant united states government |
| 24 | offices.—The term "relevant United States Gov- |
| 25 | ernment offices" means— |

7

| 1 | (A) the Unified Combatant Commands; |
|----|--|
| 2 | (B) the Office of the Secretary of Defense; |
| 3 | (C) the United States International Devel- |
| 4 | opment Finance Corporation; |
| 5 | (D) the Export-Import Bank of the United |
| 6 | States; |
| 7 | (E) the Office of the Director of National |
| 8 | Intelligence; and |
| 9 | (F) the Maritime Administration of the |
| 10 | Department of Transportation. |
| 11 | (3) Strategic port.—The term "strategic |
| 12 | port" means an international port or waterway that |
| 13 | the heads of the relevant United States Government |
| 14 | offices determine is critical to the national security |
| 15 | or economic prosperity of the United States. |