118TH CONGRESS	\mathbf{C}	
1st Session	5.	

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the Securities and Exchange Commission to require the contractual provision by large issuers of procedural privileges with respect to certain shareholder claims relating to board and management accountability for "woke" social policy actions as a condition of listing on a national securities exchange, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr.	Rubio introduced the	following	bill;	which	was	read	twice	and	referr	ed
	to the Com	nittee on								

A BILL

To amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require the Securities and Exchange Commission to require the contractual provision by large issuers of procedural privileges with respect to certain shareholder claims relating to board and management accountability for "woke" social policy actions as a condition of listing on a national securities exchange, and for other purposes.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
- 2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Mind Your Own Busi-

3 ness Act of 2023".

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

- 5 Congress finds the following:
- (1) The fiduciary duties of boards of directors
 and other corporate actors to corporations and their
 stockholders are generally established by and enforceable under State law.
 - (2) State law generally permits corporations discretion with respect to altering the rights of stockholders, including the process by which stockholders assert claims for breach of fiduciary duties by the board of directors or other corporate actors, limited by State law governing these fiduciary duties.
 - (3) The regulation of corporations as issuers of securities authorized by Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) generally regulates corporate behavior in connection with the issuance of securities, including with respect to contractual arrangements between corporations and their stockholders via provisions in the charters and bylaws of the corporations, and does not—

1	(A) establish fiduciary duties of boards of
2	directors or other corporate actors to corpora-
3	tions and their stockholders under Federal law;
4	or
5	(B) regulate the fiduciary duties of boards
6	of directors or other corporate actors to cor-
7	porations and their stockholders under State
8	law.
9	(4) The State law fiduciary duties of boards of
10	directors and other corporate actors establish certain
11	norms upon which the national market system for
12	securities has historically relied, including—
13	(A) boards of directors and other corporate
14	actors generally have fiduciary duties to their
15	respective corporations and stockholders; and
16	(B) the behavior of corporations as issuers
17	of securities will generally conform to these fi-
18	duciary duties, to the benefit of the protection
19	of investors and the public interest.
20	(5) Other norms related to the public interest
21	have historically provided critical bases upon which
22	the national market system for securities has histori-
23	cally relied, including norms that large corporate
24	issuers that are significant to the national econ-
25	omy—

1	(A) generally invest corporate resources to
2	increase the long-term value of the corporation
3	as a business rather than as an agent of social
4	change;
5	(B) do not use corporate resources to ad-
6	vance narrowly political or partisan agendas;
7	and
8	(C) do not use corporate resources to pro-
9	mote socialism, Marxism, critical race theory, or
10	other un-American ideologies among their
11	workforces or customers.
12	(6) Though these norms are not enforceable
13	legal duties of boards of directors or other corporate
14	actors under Federal law, they substantially con-
15	tribute to the commercial purpose and nationwide
16	availability of the national market system for securi-
17	ties, which are recognized by section 2 of the Securi-
18	ties Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78b) as prin-
19	cipal bases for the regulation authorized by that Act.
20	(7) Certain large corporate issuers that are sig-
21	nificant to the national economy have recently un-
22	dertaken actions which facially violate these norms
23	on account of apparent political bias. Examples of
24	such actions include the use of corporate resources
25	to—

1	(A) deny goods and services to States and
2	their political subdivisions, and private entities
3	within such States and their political subdivi-
4	sions, in response to the social policies proposed
5	or enacted in such States and their political
6	subdivisions, including those related to election
7	procedures, restrictions on abortion, protections
8	for religious freedom, and enforcement of immi-
9	gration law;
10	(B) deny goods and services to industries
11	and other classes of entities on the basis of
12	characteristics of those industries and classes
13	related to social policy, including industries in-
14	volved in the sale or manufacture of firearms,
15	operation of border security or criminal deten-
16	tion facilities, and performance of services for
17	the United States military, and classes of enti-
18	ties based on religious belief or identity;
19	(C) promote race and sex stereotyping,
20	such as those described in section 2(a) of Exec-
21	utive Order 13950 (5 U.S.C. 4103 note; relat-
22	ing to combating race and sex stereotyping),
23	which include such destructive concepts that the
24	United States is fundamentally racist or sexist,
25	an individual should be discriminated against or

receive adverse treatment solely or partly be-
cause of his or her race or sex, and meritocracy
or traits such as a hard work ethic are racist
or sexist, or were created by a particular race
to oppress another race; and
(D) openly coordinate with political actors
to pursue such actions, including—
(i) undertaking such actions upon the
action (or inaction) of boards of directors
and other corporate actors that are not
sufficiently independent from conflicts of
interest with political actors, including
elected officials, political parties, news
media, labor unions, nonprofit or non-
governmental organizations that advocate
for changes political or social policy
through issuers, other activists affiliated
with such actors, and activist investors
that advocate for changes in corporate pol-
icy primarily unrelated to the pecuniary in-
terest of the issuer; and
(ii) conceding to the demands of the
political actors without undertaking due
care.

1	(8) The prominent, open, and public facial vio-
2	lation of these norms by large corporate issuers that
3	are significant to the national economy undermine
4	the commercial purpose and nationwide availability
5	of the national market system for securities by
6	spending corporate resources on noncommercial and
7	divisive, political and partisan causes.
8	(9) The threat these actions pose to the na-
9	tional market system for securities establishes a
10	public interest in ensuring large corporate issuers
11	that are significant to the national economy—
12	(A) have adequate internal procedural
13	mechanisms to ensure the accountability of
14	boards of directors and other corporate actors
15	with respect to their adherence with the norms
16	described in this section; and
17	(B) do not unduly burden the ability of
18	stockholders to assert claims for breach of fidu-
19	ciary duty under State law where the actions at
20	issue in such claims facially violates those
21	norms.

1	SEC. 3. LISTING REQUIREMENT RELATING TO PROCE-
2	DURAL PRIVILEGES FOR CERTAIN SHARE-
3	HOLDER CLAIMS.
4	The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a
5	et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 10D (15
6	U.S.C. 78j-4) the following:
7	"SEC. 10E. PROCEDURAL PRIVILEGES FOR CERTAIN
8	SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS.
9	"(a) Definitions.—In this section:
10	"(1) Claimant.—The term 'claimant' means—
11	"(A) a person that brings a covered claim;
12	or
13	"(B) if a covered claim is brought as a
14	class action, the representative of the class in
15	that action.
16	"(2) Controller.—The term 'controller'
17	means any person or entity that has control, directly
18	or indirectly, by any means (as those terms are de-
19	fined under applicable State law), over the board of
20	directors of an issuer—
21	"(A) generally; or
22	"(B) with respect to an action at issue in
23	a covered claim.
24	"(3) COVERED CLAIM.—The term 'covered
25	claim'—

1	"(A) means any single cause of action
2	that—
3	"(i) asserts a claim for breach of fidu-
4	ciary duty owed by any corporate defend-
5	ant to the applicable issuer (or the share-
6	holders of the applicable issuer) resulting
7	from material action by any covered cor-
8	porate actor with respect to the applicable
9	issuer—
10	"(I) that is taken primarily in re-
11	sponse to a law (including a regula-
12	tion) that is enacted by a State, or a
13	bill that is introduced in the legisla-
14	ture of a State or policy otherwise
15	publicly proposed by an elected official
16	of a State, which shall include if such
17	action includes any prohibition of
18	business within that State by an
19	issuer, whether with respect to busi-
20	ness services or travel to, or major
21	events in, that State, that is facially
22	unrelated to the pecuniary interest of
23	the applicable issuer, which shall pre-
24	sumptively include if the law bill, or

1	policy would modify, establish, or cre-
2	ate a law relating to—
3	"(aa) the manner in which
4	elections are conducted in the
5	State;
6	"(bb) protecting religious
7	freedom; or
8	"(cc) limiting the availability
9	of services that include the abor-
10	tion of unborn children;
11	"(II) to prohibit the sale of goods
12	or services by any covered corporate
13	actor with respect to the applicable
14	issuer to customers who operate in an
15	industry with which the issuer en-
16	gages in such business primarily on
17	the basis of a characteristic of that in-
18	dustry that is facially unrelated to the
19	pecuniary interest of the applicable
20	issuer;
21	"(III) to promote a covered divi-
22	sive concept; or
23	"(IV) for which the reasoning
24	publicly presented by any covered cor-

1	porate actor with respect to the appli-
2	cable issuer as—
3	"(aa) any basis for such ac-
4	tion promotes a covered divisive
5	concept; or
6	"(bb) the primary basis for
7	such action is facially unrelated
8	to the pecuniary interest of the
9	applicable issuer, which shall pre-
10	sumptively include any reference
11	to diversity, equity, or inclusion
12	with respect to the composition
13	of the workforce, management, or
14	board of directors of the issuer or
15	society in general; and
16	"(ii) is brought by a covered share-
17	holder as—
18	"(I) a direct action; or
19	"(II) a derivative action or pro-
20	ceeding brought on behalf of the ap-
21	plicable issuer; and
22	"(B) does not include a cause of action
23	that asserts a claim for the breach of fiduciary
24	duty owed by any corporate defendant to the

1	applicable issuer (or the shareholders of that
2	issuer) resulting from—
3	"(i) a charitable contribution by any
4	covered corporate actor with respect to the
5	applicable issuer;
6	"(ii) the exercise of religion by any
7	covered corporate actor with respect to the
8	applicable issuer;
9	"(iii) business activity by any covered
10	corporate actor in connection with the na-
11	tional security of the United States, the
12	Armed Forces, or veterans of the Armed
13	Forces; or
14	"(iv) the limitation of business by any
15	covered corporate actor with respect to the
16	applicable issuer—
17	"(I) occurring in the jurisdiction
18	of, or with an agent of the People's
19	Republic of China, the Russian Fed-
20	eration, North Korea, Iran, Syria,
21	Sudan, Venezuela, or Cuba;
22	(Π) in connection with pre-
23	venting the abuse of internationally
24	recognized worker rights, as defined

1	in section 507 of the Trade Act of
2	1974 (19 U.S.C. 2467);
3	"(III) with any entity that de-
4	rives directly or indirectly more than
5	de minimis gross revenue through the
6	sale of products or services, or the
7	presentation of any depictions or dis-
8	plays, of a prurient sexual nature;
9	"(IV) with any entity that en-
10	gages in a commerce- or investment-
11	related boycott, divestment, or sanc-
12	tions activity that targets Israel; or
13	"(V) that is required under Fed-
14	eral, State, or local law.
15	"(4) COVERED COMPANY.—The term 'covered
16	company' means an issuer that has, as calculated in
17	accordance with section 240.12b-2 of title 17, Code
18	of Federal Regulations, or any successor regula-
19	tion—
20	"(A) a public float of more than
21	\$20,000,000,000; or
22	"(B) annual revenues of more than
23	\$5,000,000,000.
24	"(5) COVERED CORPORATE ACTOR.—The term
25	'covered corporate actor' means—

1	"(A) an issuer;
2	"(B) a director, officer, or affiliate of an
3	issuer;
4	"(C) a controller with respect to an issuer;
5	or
6	"(D) any person acting in the capacity of
7	an officer or agent of an issuer.
8	"(6) Corporate Defendant.—The term 'cor-
9	porate defendant' means any individual who—
10	"(A) is a director, officer, affiliate of an
11	issuer, or controller; and
12	"(B) may be named as a defendant in a
13	cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty
14	under applicable State law.
15	"(7) Covered divisive concept.—The term
16	'covered divisive concept' means any concept de-
17	scribed in section 2(a) of Executive Order 13950 (5
18	U.S.C. 4103 note; relating to combating race and
19	sex stereotyping).
20	"(8) Covered shareholder.—
21	"(A) IN GENERAL.—The term 'covered
22	shareholder' means a shareholder that, as of
23	the date on which a covered claim with respect
24	to the issuer is filed and at all times during
25	which the covered claim described in subpara-

1	graph (A) is pending, has continuously owned
2	not less than—
3	"(i) \$2,000 in market value of the se-
4	curities of the issuer for at least 3 years;
5	"(ii) \$15,000 in market value of the
6	securities of the issuer for at least 2 years;
7	or
8	"(iii) \$25,000 in market value of the
9	securities of the issuer for at least 1 year.
10	"(9) Director.—The term 'director' means,
11	with respect to an issuer, a member of the board of
12	directors of the issuer.
13	"(10) Investment adviser; private fund.—
14	The terms 'investment adviser' and 'private fund'
15	have the meanings given the terms in section 202 of
16	the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
17	80b-2).
18	"(11) Investment company.—The term 'in-
19	vestment company' has the meaning given the term
20	in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940
21	(15 U.S.C. 80a–3).
22	"(12) Issuer.—The term 'issuer' means an
23	issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant
24	to section 12.

1	(13) NONPECUNIARY INVESTMENT ENTITY.—
2	The term 'nonpecuniary investment entity' means—
3	"(A) any investment company or private
4	fund that invests, reinvests, or trades, or pro-
5	poses to invest, reinvest, or trade in, or that ex-
6	ercises any control right with respect to any se-
7	curity primarily on a basis that is facially unre-
8	lated to the pecuniary interest of any bene-
9	ficiary of the company or fund for which the ac-
10	tivity occurs with respect to the security;
11	"(B) any investment advisor that provides
12	any advice that is not a charitable contribu-
13	tion—
14	"(i) that is for compensation; and
15	"(ii) the basis for which is primarily
16	unrelated to the pecuniary interest of the
17	party receiving the advice;
18	"(C) any entity that engages in activism
19	with respect to issuers to which section 14 ap-
20	plies for which the primary basis of the activism
21	is facially unrelated to the pecuniary interest of
22	the issuers to which the activism is directed, in-
23	cluding—
24	"(i) nominating candidates for elec-
25	tion as directors of those issuers; or

1	"(ii) making shareholder proposals
2	pursuant to that section; and
3	"(D) any labor organization, as defined in
4	section 2 of the National Labor Relations Act
5	(29 U.S.C. 152), or pension fund affiliated with
6	a labor organization.
7	"(b) Requirements.—
8	"(1) Rules.—Not later than 1 year after the
9	date of enactment of the Mind Your Own Business
10	Act of 2023, the Commission shall, by rule, direct
11	the national securities exchanges and national secu-
12	rities associations to prohibit the listing of any secu-
13	rity of any covered company that is not in compli-
14	ance with the requirements of this section.
15	"(2) Issuer requirements.—The rules issued
16	under paragraph (1) shall require each issuer, to the
17	maximum extent permitted by State law, in the arti-
18	cles of incorporation or bylaws of the issuer, to pro-
19	vide, with respect to any covered claim, that any cor-
20	porate defendant with respect to the issuer that is
21	named as a defendant in the covered claim shall—
22	"(A) be bound by the presumptions estab-
23	lished under subsection (c) with respect to any
24	factual representation made in connection with
25	the covered claim, including any factual rep-

1	resentation relating to whether a claim asserted
2	is a covered claim;
3	"(B) have the burden of proof with respect
4	to any determination of independent business
5	judgment;
6	"(C) if the claimant obtains a judgment on
7	the merits in the covered claim, be jointly and
8	severally liable for money damages to the claim-
9	ant in an amount that is not less than the
10	greater of—
11	"(i) treble damages; or
12	"(ii) 2 times the total compensation
13	paid by the issuer to all directors of the
14	issuer for the year in which the primary
15	action alleged in the covered claim sub-
16	stantially occurred, including the market
17	value of all securities issued as compensa-
18	tion to those directors in that year;
19	"(D) if the claimant obtains all or some of
20	the relief sought in the covered claim, whether
21	by court order, settlement, voluntary change in
22	the conduct of the defendant, or otherwise, re-
23	imburse the claimant for the greatest amount
24	permitted by law with respect to all fees, costs,
25	and expenses of every kind and description (in-

1	cluding all reasonable attorney's fees and other
2	litigation expenses) that the claimant may ob-
3	tain in connection with the covered claim; and
4	"(E) not be indemnified by the issuer for
5	any liability, loss (including attorney's fees,
6	judgments, fines, or amounts paid in settle-
7	ment) incurred or suffered in connection with
8	the covered claim.
9	"(c) Presumptions.—For the purposes of this sec-
10	tion, the following presumptions shall apply with respect
11	to any covered claim, including with respect to any factual
12	representation relating to whether a claim asserted is a
13	covered claim:
14	"(1) Pecuniary interest.—There shall be a
15	presumption that the pecuniary interest of an issuer,
16	including the best interest of the issuer to the extent
17	that such interest is substantially similar to the pe-
18	cuniary interest of the issuer, does not include—
19	"(A) the morale of, or ability of the issuer
20	to hire or retain, supervisory employees in gen-
21	eral;
22	"(B) the diversity of the board of direc-
23	tors, management, or workforce in general with
24	respect to any characteristic protected by sec-

1	tion 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42
2	2000e–2);
3	"(C) the public relations, image, value of
4	marketing, or coverage by the news media of
5	the issuer; or
6	"(D) any financial benefit or reduction in
7	cost, including the cost of capital to the issuer,
8	to the extent the pecuniary benefit of or to such
9	benefit or reduction in cost is caused by the—
10	"(i) investment in the securities of the
11	issuer by a nonpecuniary investment enti-
12	ty; or
13	"(ii) inclusion of the securities of the
14	issuer in indexes created by index pro-
15	viders that select those indexes on a pri-
16	marily nonpecuniary basis or that include
17	such securities in any index on a primarily
18	nonpecuniary basis.
19	"(2) Demand excused.—For the purpose of
20	determining whether demand is excused with respect
21	to a covered claim, there shall be a presumption that
22	a director is not independent if the director is em-
23	ployed, controlled, or nominated by, or otherwise has
24	a history of affiliation with a nonpecuniary invest-

1	ment entity or any affiliate of a nonpecuniary invest-
2	ment entity.
3	"(d) Rules of Construction.—Nothing in this
4	section may be construed—
5	"(1) to limit the exercise of religion, as defined
6	in section 5 of the Religious Freedom Restoration
7	Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb-2) of any issuer or
8	any director, officer, or affiliate of an issuer; or
9	"(2) as establishing a fiduciary duty by any
10	corporate defendant or corporate actor.".